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Abstract
This study examines the international activist movement known as Sleeping Giants, a social-media “campaign to make
bigotry and sexism less profitable” (Sleeping Giants, n.d.). The campaign originated in the US with an anonymous Twitter
account that enlisted followers in encouraging brands to pull their online advertising from Breitbart News. The campaign
achieved dramatic success and rapidly spread to regions outside the US, with other anonymously run and loosely allied
chapters emerging in 15 different nations (as well as a regional chapter for the EU). Many of these were initially created to
take on Breitbart advertisers in their home countries, but in a number of cases they subsequently turned their attention to
disrupting financial support for other far-right news media in—or impacting—their home countries. Based on interviews
with leaders of eight Sleeping Giants chapters, as well as the related UK-based Stop Funding Hate campaign, this study ex-
amines the Sleeping Giants campaignwith respect to its continuity withmedia activism of previous eras, while also seeking
to understand its potential as one of the first high-profile activist campaigns to grapple with the impacts of programmatic
advertising on the news ecosystem. In particular, we consider how the campaign’s interventions speak to the larger debate
around the normative relationship between advertising and the performance of the news ecosystem.
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1. Introduction
Amid the economic collapse of many ad-driven news
publications in the US and elsewhere, a conversation
has emerged among media critics and journalism schol-
ars about the future, or lack thereof, of ad-supported
journalism. Positions within this dialogue are nuanced
and it is thus more accurate to speak of a spectrum of
viewpoints than sides in a debate. On one end are schol-
ars like Habermas (2007), Pickard (2014), or McChesney
and Nichols (2010), who argue the economic crisis in ad-
supported journalism presents an opportunity to finally
divorce journalism from the pressures of the market by
introducing public funding mechanisms. They draw on
the work of Baker (2001) and others, delineating various
ways in which reliance on advertising distorts the pub-
lic mission of journalism. At least some of these schol-
ars see efforts to restore advertising subsidies to news
as fundamentally misguided, akin to begging back into a
bad relationship.
On the other end of the aforementioned spectrum,
scholars like Couldry and Turow (2014) and academic
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researchers affiliated with the Global Disinformation
Index (Melford & Fagan, 2019)—while not averse to
the notion of publicly funded journalism—are more fo-
cused on the recent impact of behaviorally targeted ad-
vertising on news organizations and their output. They
frame many of the harms to which digital advertis-
ing has contributed—the revenue crisis at news orga-
nizations, the rise of click-driven editorial strategies,
new opportunities for ad fraud, and heightened mon-
etary incentives for the spread of disinformation and
hate speech—as potentially addressable by reforms that
would limit fraud, abuse, and marketing surveillance
while returning greater advertising subsidies to profes-
sional news organizations.
In other words, this spectrum of opinion ranges from
revolution to reform—from those who would like to dis-
mantle news organizations’ relationship with advertising
to thosewho see the relationship as reparable. As we dis-
cuss in this article, this difference in opinion also turns
up in significant ways across activist campaigns targeting
the advertising industry.
Sleeping Giants is a novel activist campaign aimed at
digital advertising that serves as an important provoca-
tion, both in the world of media activism and in the aca-
demic policy debates surrounding the appropriate rela-
tionship between journalism and advertising in the 21st
century. Based on interviews with the activists them-
selves, this study examines Sleeping Giants with respect
to its continuity with media activism of previous eras,
while also seeking to understand its potential as one of
the first high-profile activist campaigns to grapple with
the recent impacts of programmatic advertising on the
news ecosystem.
The Sleeping Giants campaign centers around two in-
tertwined issues: 1) The rapid rise in popularity of right-
wing “hyper-partisan news” sites, best exemplified by
the ascendance of Breitbart News over the course of the
2016 US presidential election; and 2) the opportunities
and threats created within the news ecosystem by con-
temporary programmatic advertising. To set the stage,
we introduce both here.
1.1. Right-Wing Hyper-Partisan News
A well-known study conducted by Faris et al. (2017)
confirmed what many media watchers had already
suspected—namely that Breitbart News, famously de-
scribed by its erstwhile executive chairman Steve Bannon
as a home for the “alt-right,” had dominated the informa-
tion diet of conservative social media users in the US dur-
ing the 2016 presidential election. Throughout this time,
the site played a substantial role in driving the agenda
of partisan conservative outlets across the web, rang-
ing from relatively popular publications to sites at the
fringes, the latter of which at times drew on Breitbart’s
more conspiratorial framings of the news to spin up out-
right hoaxes. Not only had Breitbart and its ilk come
to dominate conservative media, they also played an
agenda-setting role, drawing mainstream news outlets
into covering their favored topics, if only to contest the
original, misleading coverage, or the conspiracy theories
that evolved from it (Phillips, 2018).
While Breitbart stories have often been flagged as se-
lective and misleading in their interpretation of current
events, perhaps of greatest concern to critics is that the
site’s coverage often toes or crosses the line into hate
speech, pushing frames and inflammatory headlines that
single out women, migrants, and ethnic minorities in
troubling ways (see Figure 1). Outside the US, other far-
right partisan sites like Boulevard Voltaire (BV; France)
Figure 1. Examples of inflammatory Breitbart News headlines.
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and Nyheter Idag (Sweden) create similarly problematic
content, at times apparently influenced bymaterial from
Breitbart itself. A common feature among these sites is
that they aremonetized, in whole or in part, through pro-
grammatic advertising.
1.2. Programmatic Advertising
Much of the online advertising ecosystem has come to
be dominated by programmatic advertising. While pro-
grammatic advertising can take a number of forms, most
commonly it consists of an online auction that occurs
each time a web page is loaded, in which a publisher
puts up ad space for sale along with details on the user
about to view it. Advertisers bid on the attention of the
user based on their perceived desirability as a customer.
Intermediaries known as ad-tech firms handle the details
of each transaction. These intermediaries are numerous
(though they are often owned by the same tech giants)
and it is not uncommon for a single transaction to involve
four or more ad-tech companies. The resulting complex-
ity of each transaction, combined with the fact that pro-
grammatic advertising tends to focus advertisers’ atten-
tion on reaching desirable users at the expense of edi-
torial context, has meant that until recently advertisers
were often unaware of where on the web their ads were
appearing (Braun& Eklund, 2019;McStay, 2017;Melford
& Fagan, 2019; Turow, 2011). This opacity in the sup-
ply chain has been readily exploited by proprietors of
clickbait sites who spin up viral content featuring mira-
cle diets, strange cosmetic trends, and hoax news arti-
cles solely for the purpose of generating a profit from
programmatic ads (Bell & Owen, 2017; Braun & Eklund,
2019; Fenton & Freedman, 2017;Melford & Fagan, 2019;
Wu, 2016).
While much of this content would not have garnered
advertiser support in the era when brands still relied
on editorial context as a proxy for desirable audiences,
Malthouse, Maslowska, and Franks (2018, p. 32) note
that programmatic advertising has succeeded in separat-
ing “the value of the content product from the audience
product.” When brands can track desirable users across
the web, they not only have less incentive now than they
once did to think about editorial context, they may see
a benefit in reaching those users in the cheapest possi-
ble spaces—spaces that tend not to belong to reputable
publishers, but to clickbait artists.
This is the economic logic that incentivized the cre-
ation of many profit-driven “fake news” sites during the
2016 election and it simultaneously worked to the bene-
fit of hyper-partisan sites like Breitbart News, since they
drew traffic with inflammatory headlines that might oth-
erwise have been unpalatable to advertisers. Scholars
who study these issues in the advertising ecosystemhave
not been sanguine about the prospect of self-reform
within the ad-tech industry. Braun and Eklund (2019)
outlined a variety of ways in which the complexity of
the ad-tech ecosystem incentivized firms to act outside
the public interest while avoiding responsibility for poor
outcomes. Other researchers have similarly argued that
some combination of outside forces—political activism,
possibly followed by government regulation—are likely
to be necessary precursors for reform (e.g., Couldry &
Turow, 2014; Pickard, 2014).
It was significant, then, when the public controver-
sies surrounding “fake news” and sites like Breitbart
News in the wake of the 2016 US presidential election
arguably created a new concern for editorial context on
the part of advertisers. Braun and Eklund (2019) quote
ad-tech executive Charlie Tillinghast on this point:
As long as [brands] were reaching the person they
wanted, then theywere less concerned about the con-
text [in which their ad appeared]. But now they’re be-
ing accused of essentially funding fake news or…hate
speech or conspiracies…by virtue of the fact that their
ad is running on that site. That’s different. (p. 16)
This moment of tension and vulnerability created an
opening for creative activism, whichwas seizedmost suc-
cessfully by Sleeping Giants.
2. Methods
Couldry and Turow (2014) and Pickard (2014) have each
argued that activism in the digital advertising space is si-
multaneously essential to reforms in the public interest
and significantly complicated by the fact that someof the
issues involved are intricate and therefore potentially dif-
ficult to mobilize around. Given the notion that activism
around programmatic advertising is necessarily complex
and therefore challenging, the rapid spread of Sleeping
Giants’ tactics, which diffused and were adapted across
national contexts in the span of a few months, suggests
an important intervention in this space. We wanted to
investigate the accessibility of the model in its original
formation, as well as how it traveled so readily. Here
we narrate a significant and recent chapter in media ac-
tivism across national borders. While not a full cross-
comparative analysis of the factors that shaped spin-off
campaigns in different national contexts, we look for-
ward to analyzing international differences more fully in
future work.
We conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews
with the anonymous activists behind as many of the
Sleeping Giants chapters as we were able to reach. We
began by direct-messaging the original US chapter via
one of its social media accounts and obtaining an inter-
view. The interviewee then passed along our call for par-
ticipation to the other Sleeping Giants chapters. Those in-
terested in participating in the study reached out to us, in
some cases referring us to additional chapters. After the
culmination of this snowball sample, we reached out di-
rectly to the remaining chapters whose direct messages
were open on social media. Toward the end of the study
we also re-contacted those chapters we had spoken to
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previously whose accounts were still active to conduct
follow-up interviews regarding their activities since we
first spoke.
We interviewed activists behind eight (out of a to-
tal of sixteen) Sleeping Giants chapters, including the
US, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Australia,
Netherlands, and the EU. We conducted follow-up inter-
views with the American and French chapters. At the
suggestion of several participants, we also interviewed
Richard Wilson, the co-founder of the UK-based activist
campaign, Stop FundingHate,which is similar to Sleeping
Giants in a number of respects and has interacted sub-
stantively with various Sleeping Giants chapters in ways
participants viewed as being integral to their efforts.
Interviews averaged 65 minutes in length and were con-
ducted by phone or voice chat, though one intervie-
wee elected to participate by email and two by direct
message over social media. In all, 7.6 hours of inter-
view audio were recorded. While our sample coverage
was quite good—the interviews represented participa-
tion from 50% of the Sleeping Giants chapters—we took
advantage of the fact that our data were of a size that
could be reviewed iteratively. The authors listened to,
read transcripts of, and made detailed notes on all of the
collected interviews. We regularly compared and talked
through the notes we had made on the interview data
to identify and interrogate emergent themes. Consistent
with a “grounded theory” approach (seeGlaser& Strauss,
1967), each interview was ultimately coded according to
the themes that emerged from this process.
With the exception of Stop Funding Hate co-founder
RichardWilson,whowas a public figure at the timeof our
interview, and Sleeping Giants US founder Matt Rivitz—
whose identity was revealed by the Daily Caller and sub-
sequently published in the national press between our
initial and follow-up interviews—all of the activists we
spokewith operated anonymously. Thoughwewere able
to establish through existing contacts and secure commu-
nications that the people with whom we spoke were the
real activists behind the Sleeping Giants chapters they
claimed to represent, we do not know their real names.
Out of respect for their privacy we will use gender-
neutral pronouns below to represent their quotes.
3. How Sleeping Giants Works
Sleeping Giants’ central tactic is to invite users to take
screenshots of brands’ ads appearing on Breitbart News
or other target sites, and then to post them to Twitter
in a tweet that tags both the brand’s Twitter account
and the Sleeping Giants account. Often the screenshot
will be accompanied by images of inflammatory head-
lines the target site has posted in the past, to convey
a sense of why the placement could be problematic
for the advertiser’s image. The Sleeping Giants account
will often, but not always, retweet the user’s callout for
the sake of amplification. They will also keep track of—
and retweet—the brand’s response to the user. In cases
where the brand responds by agreeing to remove its
ads from Breitbart, Sleeping Giants will add the brand
to the public list of advertisers—currently over 4,200—
that have agreed to block Breitbart from their ad buys.
Chapters in different countries maintain analogous lists
for their regional targets. The campaign’s Twitter account
keeps a link to the relevant list, along with simple instruc-
tions for users and advertisers, in a pinned tweet, always
visible at the top of their profile page (see Figure 2). The
US andmany other Sleeping Giants chapters also run sim-
ilar campaigns on Facebook, though in interviews they
uniformly said that—for their purposes—they consider
Facebook a secondary channel, maintained for reaching
users and brands without a Twitter presence.
Figure 2. Pinned tweet on the Sleeping Giants US Twitter
account, including simple instructions for users.
Sleeping Giants has achieved dramatic success, by some
estimates cutting the number of advertisers on Breitbart
by 90% in its first two months of operation (Bhattarai,
2017), though the activists dispute this figure. In addi-
tion to the pull-out of advertisers called out by the cam-
paign, one source we spoke with explained they’d heard
privately from ad agency executives who saw the impact
of Sleeping Giants and more quietly redirected clients’
ad buys. The campaign recently won a Webby Award for
“Public Service and Activism” and since its inception its
model of activism has spread across the globe.
A key to the group’s success seems to be the way in
which it simplifies involvement by users, both by allow-
ing them to leverage the familiar tools of social media
and by breaking potential contributions down into an un-
complicated set of tasks. This lowering of barriers and
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granularity of tasks is in line with successful tactics from
past online activist campaigns, such as the circulation by
Anonymous of simple instructions and easy-to-use soft-
ware that allowed ordinary people to participate in dis-
tributed denial-of-service actions (Beyer, 2014; Sauter,
2014). It includes features of what scholars like Bruns
(2008) argue is uniquely effective about contemporary
forms of peer production and is an essential element
of what Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have dubbed
“connective action” on the part of digitally-enabled so-
cial movements.
At the same time, the Sleeping Giants campaign calls
to mind far more traditional activist techniques, such as
the advertiser boycott.
3.1. The Treachery of Boycotts
While Sleeping Giants insists in its public-facing FAQs and
other documents that it is not a boycott, it looks an awful
lot like one. User replies to callout tweets on the Sleeping
Giants Twitter account are replete with threats by users
to stop purchasing the brands in question. In thinking
through how Sleeping Giants fits into the larger picture
of media reform, it is worth puzzling out the similarities
and differences between its activities and traditional ad-
vertiser boycotts.
During the heyday of network television, Fahey
(1991) observed that in many cases consumer boycotts
targeting the advertisers on objectionable programming
did little to actually harm sales revenues on the part of
the affected brands. Rather, the threat of proposed or
actual boycotts was primarily reputational. Friedman’s
(1999) taxonomy of consumer boycotts also underscores
this point, drawing a distinction between “marketplace-
oriented” and “media-oriented” boycotts. Though the
two overlap, they differ in their primary objectives—the
former seeks to change companies’ behavior by denting
sales revenues,while the latter ismostly about the threat
of reputational damage to brands.
Many advertiser boycotts, in other words, are primar-
ily undertaken by activists not to impact sales, but to cre-
ate a news hook that may—if the company does not re-
spond in the desired manner—generate negative cover-
age and bad publicity that damages public perception of
a brand. Thus, while media activism targeting advertis-
ers is sometimes conceptualized as a boycott, it may be
more accurate to characterize it as a formof “flak,” which
Herman and Chomsky (2008) defined as disciplining the
media through complaint, or essentially, in the sphere of
public relations.
Advertising is conventionally understood to be fo-
cused on selling products, but a compelling goal of all
advertising (and sometimes the primary goal) is to pro-
mote brand awareness, relevance, and positive affect.
Therefore, a campaign that puts a brand in a negative
light or changes the conversation or meaning of that
brand is a significant threat, even if it isn’t immediately
associated with a decline in sales via an effective boycott.
While scholars have typically associated flak with
right-wing activists, who in the 1980s and 1990s became
well-known for protesting content on the basis usually
of its depictions of sex and sexuality (McAllister, 1996;
Rentschler, 2003), it has become amorewidely-used tool
across the political spectrum. It’s also become easier to
accomplish outside the structure of a pre-existing organi-
zation given the affordances of social media. While flak
works especially well if you’re well-funded, with lobby-
ists, lawyers, and connections to journalists, it can also
be a tool for less-resourced organizations like Sleeping
Giants. When Sleeping Giants wants to critique or praise
a brand, it can reach hundreds of thousands of users
directly—and even generate news coverage—through its
interactions on social media.
If the contemporary internet has reconfigured ac-
tivists’ access to audiences, it has also changed the na-
ture of their access to brands. The shift to digital mar-
keting has led to what Sauter (2014, p. 151) dubs “the
avatar nature of online brand presence,” in which large,
distributed corporations are represented by a singleweb-
site or social media account. As Sauter notes, this cre-
ates a strange, if imperfect, symmetry between individu-
als and organizations, both of which may be represented
online by a single website or profile page.
As Sauter describes it, this concentration of large or-
ganizations into single sites and accounts also creates a
centralized target for campaigns—a handful of activists
might not be able to block the entrance to every store
in a large retail chain. But online, where the chain is
represented by a single website, a small group of hack-
tivists, using a distributed denial-of-service attack on the
retailer’s servers, can shutter a multinational business’s
online presence for hours.
As withwebsites, there is greater symmetry between
users and brands on social media, where a large corpo-
ration and an ordinary user each tweet from accounts
that follow roughly the same online physics. Brands fol-
low and are followed, tag and are tagged, comment and
reply, retweet and are retweeted, in much the same
way as other users—and this “avatar-ization” gives ac-
tivists leverage. Richard Wilson is the co-founder of
the Stop Funding Hate campaign in the UK, which fo-
cuses on inflammatory rhetoric in British tabloids us-
ing tactics that are, in part, similar to those of Sleeping
Giants. Namely, Stop Funding Hate lobbies advertisers—
through new and traditional media channels—to pull
their ads from publications that print inflammatory anti-
immigrant rhetoric. He described this newfound lever-
age as follows:
For a lot of these big brands—particularly brands who
are targeting people under 40 or people under 50—
their primary strategy for reaching their customers
and having a conversation with their customers is so-
cial media. So, if you’re jumping into that conversa-
tion on Twitter and going, “Hang on a minute, you’re
supposed to be brilliantly inclusive on LGBTQ issues,
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 68–79 72
but here you are with this notoriously homophobic
newspaper and I’m really disillusioned,” you’re not
just sending them a message. You’re sending them a
public message and you’re doing it right in the space
where they’ve invested lots ofmarketing budget to be
all, kind of chatty and conversational. And you’re say-
ing, “Okay, let’s have a conversation. And this is what
we want to converse about.” I think it’s totally trans-
formative. (personal communication)
3.2. Corporate Social Responsibility
In much the same way we have characterized the spec-
trum of positions taken by journalism scholars on the
appropriate relationship between news and advertising,
the literature on activism often places activist groups
on a spectrum ranging from “reformist” to “radical”
(de Bakker, 2015; den Hond&de Bakker, 2007), where re-
formist groups are amenable to working within a system
to change it while more radical groups seek to dismantle
or abandon systems they view as irretrievably corrupt.
As Carrie A. Rentschler observes, “Many social move-
ments from the political right to the political left make
strategic use of themediawithout also seeking to change
the corporate, profit-oriented structure of the media”
(2003, p. 530). For example, campaigns, by Sleeping
Giants and others, against Fox News personalities whose
actions either on the air or in their personal conduct
have been found by progressive media activists to be
intolerable—from Bill O’Reilly to Tucker Carlson to Laura
Ingraham—have targeted companies who advertise dur-
ing these shows in order to pursue the goal of remov-
ing objectionable people or discourse from amajor cable
news network. Sometimes they succeed (e.g., O’Reilly).
At the same time, though, this activism arguably bolsters
the system of advertiser-support, and the legitimacy of
corporations censoring media content, that is typically
anathema to progressive causes (Soley, 2002).
Where Sleeping Giants self-identifies on the politi-
cal spectrum is a matter we will return to shortly. Given
their campaigns typically target right-wing media, how-
ever, they are most often labeled in media coverage
as progressives. To the extent the label applies, there
is an inescapable irony in progressives, in the 21st cen-
tury, pressuring corporate sponsors as a way to disci-
pline the media, when in the 20th century the corporate
sponsor was viewed by many progressives as one of the
central limitations to a free, vibrant, and diverse media
system. Herbert Schiller wrote, “what can be expected
if the channels of expression and the cultural conduits
are clogged with corporate speech and values?” (1991,
p. 59). As Matthew P. McAllister (1996) wrote, regard-
ing the history of socially conservative groups using cam-
paigns and boycotts targeted at advertisers to censor the
television environment:
The most visible boycotts have been, if anything,
destructive to democratic society. This is because
many boycotts against advertisers, paradoxically,
serve to increase the social influence of advertisers.
Conservative media critics—such as Donald Wildmon
of the American Family Association—often target ad-
vertisers of TV programs that they find objection-
able….Essentially they coerce advertisers into assert-
ing their economic control over media content. If the
boycott is successful, it has increased the power of
advertising over media. To stop the boycott, advertis-
ersmaywithdraw funding from a program,whichmay
send a message to the media that such programs are
not wanted. A successful boycott of this kind teaches
the media another lesson about the power of adver-
tising. (p. 256)
Progressive activists must decide if using the “master’s
tools” to dismantle a particular part of his house is the
approach they wish to take, as an effective short-term
strategy could have unintended long-term consequences
(Rentschler, 2003, p. 530).
In the world of online activism, it’s easy to see collec-
tives like those behindAnonymous as existing toward the
more radical end of the reformist-radical spectrum, en-
gaging in actions intended to dismantle or severely dam-
age targeted organizations like the Church of Scientology
or the cybersecurity firm HBGary (Beyer, 2014; Coleman,
2014). Within the world of advertising activism specifi-
cally, approaches like “culture jamming,” “subvertising,”
and “Brandalism” occupy the radical end of the spec-
trum (Lasn, 1999; Lekakis, 2017). Collectively referred
to as “tactical media,” these strategies take a participa-
tory, interventionist approach to undermining the cul-
tural authority of the advertising ecosystem (Garcia &
Lovink, 1997)—for example, by creating counterfeit ad-
vertisements with activist messages that shame targeted
brands. Sleeping Giants, meanwhile, represents a much
more buttoned-down, reformist approach to digital ac-
tivism, framing the problem of hate speech as an issue
of corporate social responsibility.
When we asked various chapters whether they
hoped to get rid of Breitbart News and other far-right
publications, we were uniformly told that our question
missed the point. To begin with, Breitbart News is sup-
ported by private investors, meaning it can still survive
without substantial ad revenue. The distinction, how-
ever, went beyond this. The activist behind the Sleeping
Giants Sweden account gave a representative quote:
The main point is not completely defunding them, be-
cause I’m not sure whether that can be done. The
main point, to me, is to make sure that it doesn’t
get normalized to have your ads on websites like that.
Because we’re on a dangerous road if mainstream
companies advertise on those sites and their clients
give no reaction. (personal communication)
This points to a key aspect, both of Sleeping Giants as
a campaign, and of corporate social responsibility cam-
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paigns more broadly, which is that the ultimate aim is
to redefine the bounds of acceptable behavior within
a field (de Bakker, 2015; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007).
Sleeping Giants is trying to use the specter of brand dam-
age to change (or restore) the perspective—“field frame”
(Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003)—within the in-
dustry to one in which brands have a moral responsi-
bility to both know and be selective about where their
ads appear.
Though Sleeping Giants confronts brands with the
specter of negative publicity, across the board chapters
told us theywere “an information campaign, not a shame
campaign.” The idea was that, because of the opacity
of the programmatic advertising ecosystem, many ad-
vertisers likely had no idea their ads were appearing on
Breitbart News or other inflammatory publications. Thus,
the activists framed their activities as a service to brands
rather than a campaign to shame them into submission.
As Wilson highlights above, however, contacting
brands in public rather than over private channels raises
the stakes around compliance. And,while SleepingGiants
founder Matt Rivitz told us many brands were appre-
ciative when notified their ads had been appearing on
Breitbart, this did not typically result in a warm relation-
ship between the campaigns and the brands they had
contacted going forward. “No one wants to talk about it
when it’s all over,” he said. “It’s a little like you guys just
did something together and then everyone’s like, ‘Okay,
thatwasweird.’ Youhad apretty intense date and thenno
one’s calling back afterward” (personal communication).
Rivitz also clarified that the campaign was willing to
shame companies. It reserved shaming, however, for the
ad-tech companies and social media platforms it saw as
being primarily responsible for enabling the monetiza-
tion of hate speech. But,much like the activists who used
advertiser boycotts against network television program-
ming in past decades after finding the networks them-
selves unresponsive (Fahey, 1991), Rivitz said advertisers
were the parties in the equation who were most willing
to listen to consumer complaints.
As with the television networks, platforms offer con-
tent to users for free and sell their attention to adver-
tisers, recalling the old adage, “If you’re not paying for it,
you’re not the customer, you’re the product.” Or, as Rivitz
framed it more bluntly, “KFC doesn’t ask the chickens
what they want to do with the company” (personal com-
munication). Advertisers, meanwhile, spend a great deal
on cultivating an image of inclusivity around both their
customer base and their hiring practices, and are there-
foremore sensitive regarding threats to this perception—
hence the common industry term, “brand safety,” in ref-
erence to the ideal that ads should appear only in places
unlikely to damage a company’s image by association.
A campaign that bills itself as providing a major ser-
vice to brands is far more reformist than revolutionary.
And, as noted above, despite taking aim at far-right me-
dia, activism intent on reifying the traditional advertis-
ingmodelmight be thought of as inherently conservative
in some ways. From the activists’ own perspective there
are no paradoxes in this. Rivitz explained that standing
against hate and bigotry should fundamentally not be
viewed as a partisan stance.
4. An International Movement
Sleeping Giants’ success in the US quickly inspired
spinoffs in other countries. Some of these approached
the founders of the initial accounts to inquire about cre-
ating a new national chapter, while others were individ-
uals who contributed actively to the original social me-
dia campaign as ordinary users and were subsequently
invited by the existing activists to create accounts in their
various home countries. The chapters communicate via
a backchannel and informally vet the addition of people
and chapters, for example determining if anyone in the
existing group can vouch for a new individual.
A good number of the non-US chapters joined in
response to the announcement by Breitbart News that
the publication would be expanding its operations in
Europe, and for many of these chapters the initial aim
was to aid the US campaign by advising the advertis-
ers in their respective countries to pull their ads from
Breitbart, thus reducing the apparent profit potential of
such an expansion.
These chapters operated in the native languages of
their home countries and the Sleeping Giants EU account
worked, through retweets, to create a centralized record
of their various contributions to the list of advertisers
blacklisting Breitbart, which could be referenced to up-
date the figures maintained by the US campaign.
In Germany and elsewhere, chapters maintained a
relatively narrow focus on Breitbart as a target. The
German activist we spokewith said this was for three rea-
sons: 1) Breitbart had announced explicit plans to move
into Germany, creating a sense of urgency around halt-
ing such an expansion; 2) they assessedmost of the local
sites that toed or crossed the line into hate speech to
be small, and feared targeting them could inadvertently
give them publicity; and 3) the existence of a particu-
larly aggressive trolling culture among far-right German
social media users raised concerns about doxing and tar-
geted harassment.
As time went on, however, at least some chapters
turned their attention to publications closer to home.
The Swedish and Dutch activists were especially inter-
ested in Breitbart because it had a sizable audience in
their home countries. But they quickly identified home-
grown publications monetizing inflammatory content as
well. In the Netherlands, activists took aim at the com-
mercial publication GeenStijl.
Sleeping Giants Sweden identified Samhällsnytt
(“Society News,” formerly Avpixlat or “Un-Pixelated”)
and Nyheter Idag (“News Today”) as particularly prob-
lematic. According to the Swedish activists, much of the
content of these publications consists of loose rewrites
of Breitbart material. Both sites, which have ties to
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the Sweden Democrats (a far-right party with ethno-
nationalist roots) and a more radical splinter party re-
spectively, were identified independently by researchers
at the Oxford Internet Institute (Hedman et al., 2018) as
leading purveyors of “junk news” in Sweden.
In Switzerland, activists took aim at messages from
the Swiss People’s Party, which put out anti-migrant ma-
terials in the form of inflammatory political advertising
(this is the party responsible for the notorious black-
sheep billboard image), and a newspaper insert contain-
ing misleading statements. They also coordinated with
Sleeping Giants France in actions against the French
publication BV—to be discussed shortly—which enjoyed
a sizable readership among Switzerland’s Francophone
population.
The Australian chapter, one of the last to join in mid-
2017, meanwhile focused tightly not on far-right web-
sites, but on the Murdoch news empire in Australia—
particularly the Sky News Australia cable channel, which
the activists discussed as the primary platform through
which hateful ideas and the personalities conveying
them were being mainstreamed into the Australian me-
dia ecosystem.
Many of these chapters started in early 2017 and pe-
tered out the following year, gradually ceasing to post or
retweet. A number of activists noted that European adver-
tisers, who often hadn’t thought to blacklist Breitbart be-
cause they hadn’t anticipated it would have a local read-
ership, were very quick to pull their ads. As such, Wilson
conjectured that at least some chapters likely shut down
out of a sense their mission had been accomplished.
But as Beyer (2014) has noted, this drop-off is fairly
typical for online mobilizations, wherein participation
tails away after an initial hot period, but leaves behind
“sticky” activists—passionate people mobilized by the
campaignwho remain committed to the issues thatmost
concerned them and continue tomount effective actions
into the future. At the timeof thiswriting, active chapters
remain in Canada, the Netherlands, France, and the US.
4.1. The French Example
While the limited space of a single article necessarily
precludes us from discussing each international Sleeping
Giants chapter and the conditions in which it operates
in depth, as an example of the campaign’s malleability
and theways inwhich cultural and political contexts have
shaped activist actions, here we explore one of these
chapters in greater detail. Among themost interesting of
the cases is the French chapter of Sleeping Giants, where
activists expanded greatly beyond the initial tactics em-
ployed by the movement.
To begin with, French law places greater limits on the
protection of speech, restricting the ability of activists
to label sites as “racist” or “fascist,” since they would
be asserting criminality and inviting potential legal reper-
cussions. To work around such constraints, the activists
created software that sorts inflammatory headlines from
BV—one of their target sites—based on tags describing
the type of inflammatory rhetoric employed. The pro-
gram creates composite images, like those in Figure 3,
which concentrate the site’s worst rhetoric into share-
Figure 3. Examples of software-generated graphics from Sleeping Giants France. Notes: New images are generated regu-
larly to leverage the Twitter algorithm’s preference for fresh content. Translations courtesy of Sleeping Giants France.
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able graphics designed tomake an impact on advertisers.
Sharing a graphic of a dozen or so headlines demonizing
migrants or another showing misogynist language easily
gets the point to advertisers.
As the above example suggests, the French activists
are among the most tech savvy of the Sleeping Giants
collective. They regularly inspect the source code of BV—
the aforementioned French publication, loosely analo-
gous to Breitbart—to identify which ad-tech services are
in use on the site (see Figure 4). At one point the cam-
paign had so thoroughly demonetized BV that the site
stopped selling ads altogether for a time. The activists’
source code inspections also revealed at one point that
BV was attempting to compensate for lost revenue by
employing crypto-jacking scripts—JavaScript code that
enlisted unwitting users’ browsers to mine cryptocur-
rency. Sleeping Giants France quickly publicized this fact,
forcing BV to pull the code from its site to avoid anger-
ing readers.
Sleeping Giants France has also engaged in ac-
tions beyond social media. Perhaps the most illus-
trative example is the group’s response to European
white supremacist group Generation Identity’s project,
“Operation Defend Europe.”
Operation Defend Europe was a crowdfunded cam-
paign aimed at launching a boat expedition in the
Mediterranean to interfere with migrant rescue efforts.
Sleeping Giants France joined other activists in writing
to banks in Austria, Italy, Germany, and France to have
Generation Identity’s accounts closed. They also helped
to get the group’s accounts on PayPal and various crowd-
funding sites blocked.
Generation Identity then turned to WeSearchr to
raise funds, an American crowdfunding platform run by
white supremacists (and listed by the Southern Poverty
Law Center as a hate group). In response, Sleeping Giants
France published a public dossier to raise awareness
amongofficials of Generation Identity’s plans. Alongwith
other activists, they wrote to port cities, delaying the ex-
pedition’s launch and later notifying the mayors of port
cities where the group might try to land their boat, re-
sulting in these ports being closed to the group by wait-
ing police. Ultimately, Operation Defend Europe ended
when the boat, broken down and unable to dock, was
rescued and towed into port.
While Sleeping Giants France is quick to point
out they collaborated with other activist groups in
their actions against Operation Defend Europe, the
case serves as an example not only of how a chap-
ter adapted Sleeping Giants’ basic tactics to its local
context, but how it extended the basic mission state-
ment of the movement—“to make bigotry and sexism
less profitable”—to a different domain, intervening in a
crowdfunded operation by white supremacists.
5. Anonymity and Collaboration
With two notable exceptions—Matt Rivitz, who was un-
masked by the conservative media outlet, the Daily
Caller, and Nandini Jammi, who partners in the work on
the US account and whose identity was revealed in sub-
sequent reporting by the New York Times—all of the ac-
tivists behind the various Sleeping Giants chapters have
remained anonymous. The choice to remain anonymous
was typically framed as having to do with a combination
of concerns.
First, many of the activists in their day jobs had
some relationship to marketing, advertising, or media—
Figure 4. BV became aware Sleeping Giants France was inspecting their source code and inserted this HTML comment into
their pages for the activists to find.
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another key reason for the group’s reformist stance—
and worried their careers or client relationships might
be impacted were their identities revealed. Second, as
Marwick and Lewis (2017) have documented, critics of
the far right and “alt-right” are often subjected to doxing
and targeted online harassment. Finally, there was con-
cern that were the activists to identify themselves, their
personalities could at best serve as a distraction and at
worst invite opponents to attempt to discredit the move-
ment by sullying the reputation of individuals.
It’s worth noting, too, Sleeping Giants’ approach
combines advantages of both identity and anonymity.
Advertisers see the accounts of the ordinary, identi-
fied users it amplifies through retweets, giving messages
the sheen of authenticity. Simultaneously, the absence
of identifying information on the activist accounts sug-
gests an imposing collective in the style of Anonymous.
Jessica Beyer (personal communication, 2019) notes
that whereas in the case of Anonymous, anonymity
began as a technical constraint of the 4chan message
boards and evolved into one of the group’s core values,
Sleeping Giants—having learned by example the advan-
tages anonymity provided—adopted it as a strategy on
social media platforms where real names are the default.
Sleeping Giants activists communicate through
backchannels that also allow them to remain anonymous
to one another (if they do not already know one an-
other’s identities, which ismost often the case). Rivitz de-
scribed the atmosphere by referencing the film Reservoir
Dogs, which famously features a group of thieves who
know one another only by pseudonyms. Mostly, the
group communicated to vet new chapters, seek advice,
share domain-specific expertise, or request retweets to
amplify their messages when the fate of a major adver-
tiser was on the line. But, as the different directions
taken by various chapters suggest, they in many ways
operate independently of one another.
Collaborations with outside activist groups were
also greatly beneficial. For example, Richard Wilson of
Stop Funding Hate was able on occasion to effectively
make the group’s concerns heard in institutional settings
where anonymity would otherwise have been a barrier
to participation. Most notably, he discussed Sleeping
Giants’ work alongside that of his own campaign in
front of the United Nations, which subsequently inserted
language on ethical advertising into the 2018 Global
Compact on Migration, which supports the demonetiza-
tion of media outlets that systematically promote intol-
erance toward migrants.
6. Conclusion
As Sleeping Giants chapters have withered in many coun-
tries, some of those that remain are looking to create
more formal and sustainable structures around their ac-
tivism. Several chapters expressed a desire to help create
a set of standards for ethical advertising—formal guide-
lines for ad placement to which brands could adhere
to gain a seal of approval, changing the relationship be-
tween activists and brands from a stick to a carrot.
In the US, the exposure of Rivitz and Jammi’s iden-
tities has also opened a new chapter for the movement.
While the revelation brought death threats from internet
trolls and sabre rattling by Breitbart’s lawyers, Rivitz has
attempted to leverage the spotlight placed on his iden-
tity, writing op-eds, appearing in the national media, and
speaking to the industry in formal settings that would’ve
been inaccessible previously. Jammi likewise utilized her
newfound prominence to pressure PayPal into dropping
the KKK as a customer, among other endeavors.
Though the loose online collective may continue to
exist in some form, at least some corners of the Sleeping
Giants movement appear poised to make the transi-
tion from internet-based to internet-enabled activism
(van Laer & van Aelst, 2010) and to a more formal insti-
tutional presence.
Beyer (2014), in examining the trajectory of digital
activism, suggests online mobilization often involves the
emergence within internet spaces of particular value
statements that subsequently become boundary objects
(Star & Griesemer, 1989). As they circulate through on-
line channels, these statements of values are adapted by
adherents to the particulars of the local cultural and legal
contexts they inhabit.
Sleeping Giants’ mission statement—tomake bigotry
and sexism less profitable—certainly fits this bill. The
values Beyer discusses in relation to Anonymous and
The Pirate Bay center around free speech, whereas the
Sleeping Giants case is more about shared concern over
the appropriate limits of speech; this points to distinc-
tions in both the actors involved and the political mo-
ment. But her observation that a broad, unifying value
can be a precursor to online mobilization across a wide
swathe of geographic and cultural contexts holds well in
the present case. The examples of different international
chapters show how the original activists’ concern—the
profitability of hate speech—was adapted to different
cases, from political advertising that demonizesmigrants
in Switzerland, to legacy media with intolerant messages
in Australia, to crowdfunding by white supremacists in
France, and elsewhere.
Much as John Lennon’s 1969 motto “give peace a
chance,” was intentionally contrasted with complex po-
litical arguments, the simplicity of Sleeping Giants’ mis-
sion statement—and its tactics—also stand in effective
contrast to claims by digital platforms about the spiral-
ing complexity involved in improving moderation and re-
forming programmatic advertising. This contrast is one
the activists are quick to leverage strategically, pointing
to their successes as a group of ragtag volunteers as coun-
terevidence to the platforms’ arguments. As a Sleeping
Giants France activist put it, “there are companies who
make billions out of advertising every year who have all
the means, the technology, the staff, the knowledge to
do what we’re doing. And they don’t. So there is a big
problem here” (personal communication).
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This quote raises a key point. Examined through the
lens of the ad-supported journalism debate, Sleeping
Giants is clearly reformist. But the campaign is not solely
about disciplining media that traffic in hate speech—
which they see as having a right to exist, though not
to ad dollars—or chastening advertisers, for whom they
see themselves as providing a service. To the extent that
Sleeping Giants’ work is about bludgeoning ad-tech firms
and dominant online platforms for business practices
that uncritically amplify and monetize hate, the cam-
paign takes on a decidedly less reformist, if not necessar-
ily radical, cast. After all, advocating significant structural
changes to address societal harms generated by Google
and other tech giants is a position familiar to Pickard
(2014) and other media critics who favor more “revolu-
tionary” approaches to media reform.
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